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THE RECOGNITION OF LEGITIMATE RENEWAL
EXPECTANCIES IN BROADCAST LICENSING
1. INTRODUCTION
The Communications Act of 1934' provides that the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) shall grant a broadcaster's license for
a maximum period of three years2 to any applicant it deems sufficiently
able to serve the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."'3 At the
expiration of the three year term,4 the FCC may renew the license for
another three years if the incumbent again meets the "public interest"
criteria.5 Implicit in the three year limitation is a recognition that the
"field of broadcasting is one of free competition"6 and that a station
license vests in a licensee only so long as it serves the "public interest."7
Despite these objectives, the FCC has traditionally favored an in-
1. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-398 (1976).
2. Id. § 307(d). See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976).
4. Recent legislative proposals would grant broadcasters longer license terms. See S. 611,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(a) (1979); S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 332(a)(b) (1979); H.R. 3333,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 461, 471 (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 431 (1978). See also
note 161 infra and accompanying text.
5, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976) provides:
Upon the expiration of any license, upon application therefore, a renewal of such license
may be granted from time to time for a term not to exceed three years in the case of
broadcasting licenses ... if the Commission finds that the public interest, convenience,
and necessity would be served thereby.
Although the public interest standard has never been subject to precise legislative definition, it is
not unconstitutionally vague. See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953)
(standard not "too indefinite for fair enforcement"); McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239
F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957) (public interest determined on case-
by-case basis). The Supreme Court in National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190 (1943),
recognized that the public interest requires the "fullest and most effective use of the spectrum."
Id. at 218. The Court further defined public interest as "the interest of the listening public in the
larger and more effective use of radio." Id. at 216. Commissioner Quello defined the public
interest as "what people would do if they thought clearly, decided rationally, and acted disinter-
estedly." Quello, Its Time to Rewrite the Communications Act, and Also Time to Set Some Priori-
ties, TELEVISION/RADIo AGE April 10, 1978, at 114.
6. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Stations, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1939).
7. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307(d), 309(h) (1976). The Act specifically requires a licensee to sign a
waiver renouncing any claim to continued use of a frequency. Id. at § 304. See also Ashbacker
Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945) (dictum); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Stations, 309 U.S.
470 (1939) (dictum).
Washington University Open Scholarship
410 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:409
cumbent licensee when faced with a competitive challenger.8  The
seemingly routine judicial affirmation of the Commission's preference
for the incumbent9 has led at least one court to label the practice as
giving rise to a "renewal expectancy."'" The Commission's strong pref-
erence for the incumbent evolves from its attempt to "secur[e] the max-
imum benefits of radio [television],"'" yet maintain stability' 2 in the
broadcast industry. 3
This Note traces the judicial and self-imposed constraints on the
Commission that led to the policy of renewal expectancy. After devel-
oping a history of communications licensing, the Note concentrates on
8. See Cowles Florida Broadcasting, 60 F.C.C.2d 372 (1976), affd on reconsideration, 62
F.C.C.2d 953 (1977), vacatedsub nom. Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. dimissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979); In re RKO General, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 123 (1973),
afl'd sub nom. Fidelity Television v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926
(1975); Moline Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263 (1971); Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp.
(WTHI-TV), 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963); Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149, qadon reconsid.
era/on, 16 F.C.C. 141 (1951).
For a criticism of the Commission's renewal policy, see Cox & Johnson, Broadcasting in
4merica and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1 (1968)
(statement by Federal Communications Commissioners) [hereinafter cited as Cox & Johnson].
9. See Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926
(1975); Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971); WOKO, Inc. v.
FCC, 153 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 223 (1946); Chicago Fed'n of
Labor v. FRC, 41 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
10. Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37,42 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed,
99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979). See Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 926 (1975); Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
11. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943). See FCC v. Sand-
ers Bros. Radio Stations, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 105 F.2d 36
(D.C. Cir. 1939), rev'don other ground, 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
12. The Commission's emphasis on stability in the industry stems from the belief that uncer-
tainty of renewal would discourage investment, lead to maximization of short-term profits, and
induce substandard performance. In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Re-
newal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 420 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Formulation of Policies]; Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hear-
ings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 425 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
Policy Statement].
The courts recognize that stability might be one method by which to further the "public inter-
est." See Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dis-
missed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 858 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
13. The Commission is keenly aware that depriving an incumbent of renewal will result in
huge financial losses. See e.g., Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp. (WTHI-TV), 35 F.C.C. 677
(1963); Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149, a'd on reconsideration, 16 F.C.C. 141 (1951).
The Commission recently denied renewal to three television stations owned by General Tire &
Rubber Company. The possible loss attributable to the Commission's decision is estimated at
$300 million. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 25, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
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the recent landmark case of Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC.1 4 The
last sections discuss the implications of Central Florida, congressional
attempts to revise renewal procedures, and the need for a policy of re-
newal expectancy to promote industry stability.
II. LICENSING PROCEDURES
A. The Comparative Hearing
The Commission typically conducts two types of licensing proce-
dures. The noncomparative 15 hearing, which simply consists of an ap-
plication for a broadcast license by a single licensee to operate on an
available open channel, is the more inexpensive and easier to adminis-
ter of the two procedures. The Commission considers three criteria:' 6
(1) whether the applicant's proposed programming 7 meets the "needs
and interests of the community";' 8 (2) whether the proposed license
poses economic ramifications to existing licenses;19 and (3) whether the
14. 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979).
15. The licensing procedure is a two-step process. The applicant must first apply for and be
granted a construction permit, which allows him to build the facility. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(ee),
319 (1976); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.3511, 73.3533 (1979). After construction, the Commission generally
grants, in a summary fashion, the permit to operate. See Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S.
327, 328 n.1 (1945); 47 U.S.C. § 319(c) (1976). The applicant in a noncomparative hearing must
pay an application fee, see 47 C.F.R. § 1. 1111 (1979), and probably attorney's fees for preparation
of the application. These costs, however, compare favorably with hearing costs, which can be $3.5
million for the initial hearing stage alone. See Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d
372, 447 n.34 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting). For a comprehensive discussion of the
Commission's licensing procedures, see Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Compara-
tive Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1-61 (1971).
16. All applicants must meet legal, technical, and financial qualifications before the Commis-
sion will take evidence on public interest issues. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(b), 313(a), 319(a) (1976).
17. The Commission is primarily concerned with the licensee's programming. The Commis-
sion has been reluctant, however, to move from general to specific standards for appraising pro-
grams, relying instead on agency intuition. See notes 72, 80 infra and accompanying text. See
also Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct.
2189 (1979).
18. The Commission requires applicants to make a detailed study of the programming needs
of the service area by questioning community leaders. See Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303
(1960). The "ascertainment" procedure received judicial approval in Great Lakes Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 289 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1960). In 1961 the Commission denied a license to an appli-
cant who proposed the same type of programming for three stations located in different commu-
nities. See Suburban Broadcasters, Inc., 30 F.C.C. 1021 (1961), aj'd, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
19. See Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Carroll is the lead-
ing case on the FCC's consideration of economic harm to existing stations in an advertising mar-
ket when determining whether to license a new station. The Court held that "when an existing
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granting of the license will result in undue concentration of the mass
media.2°
The more difficult situation arises when two or more applicants vie
for the right to operate under the same license.21 The Communications
Act does not explicitly provide the Commission with a procedure to
compare competing applicants, 22 but the Supreme Court in Ashbacker
Radio Corp. v. FCC,23 interpreted what is now section 309(e)24 of the
Act to require the FCC to consider mutually exclusive applicants at the
same time. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also upheld
licensee offers to prove that the economic effect of another station would be detrimental to the
public interest, the Commission should afford an opportunity for presentation of such proof, and,
if the evidence is substantial. . .. should make a finding or findings." Id. at 443. See FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Stations, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134 (1940).
20. In any particular market, a licensee may own only one AM/FM combination and one
television station. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.35(b) (1978) (AM); id. at § 73.240(a)(2) (FM); id. at
§ 73.636(a)(2) (television). Nationally, one licensee may own seven AM, seven FM, and seven
television stations. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, .240, .636 (1978). The Commission also may consider
whether a broadcast license will result in a concentration of all media, including newspapers. See,
e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); McClatchy Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957); Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
21. Competitive applications occur in two situations: (1) at renewal time, when an incum-
bent is faced with a challenge to its license; and (2) in an original proceeding, when two or more
new applicants wish to operate on one available frequency. In both original and renewal cases
challenges do not necessarily arise from competing broadcasters. Section 307(d) provides that any
"party in interest" may file a petition for denial. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1976); 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.580(i) (1978). See also National Organization for Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (women's group); Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(citizens' group); Spanish Int'l Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (ethnic
group); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (religious group).
22. The Act requires the Commission to hold a hearing only when denying a license or when
there are "substantial and material question[s] of fact" on which the Commission is unable to
reach a finding. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 309(e) (1976).
23. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1976) (originally § 309(a) (1934)).
25. The Commission considered the applicants mutually exclusive, even though they wished
to operate in different cities, because their simultaneous operation would have resulted in signal
interference. 326 U.S. 327, 328 (1945). Technically, at least, the Commission complied with the
hearing requirement. Noting the exclusivity of the licensees, the FCC granted one application and
set a later hearing for the other applicant. The Supreme Court held, however, that the burden of
persuasion necessary to dislodge the successful applicant would be difficult to overcome and,
therefore, the hearing was an "empty thing." Id. at 329-32.
Ashbacker involved two original candidates; the Commission, however, also applies the proce-
dure in cases of mutually exclusive applications for renewal. See cases cited note 8 supra. See
also Moline Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263 (1971); The Tribune Co., 19 F.C.C. 100 (1954).
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an applicant's right to a comparative hearing, 26 despite the Commis-
sion's recent insistence that the procedure is unworkable and unneces-
sary in the renewal context.27
B. The Development of the Comparative Criteria
Although the courts require the FCC to hold comparative hearings, 2
the Commission retains comprehensive powers29 to determine stan-
dards by which to evaluate applicants. The broad requirement of the
Act-to select the licensee who will best serve the public interest-al-
lows the Commission to develop extensive comparative criteria.30
These criteria have never been the subject of administrative rulemak-
ing; rather, the criteria evolved on a case-by-case basis3I as the Com-
mission "gained new insight into the relevant issues of the comparative
proceeding. 32
The Commission's ad hoc approach led to an exhaustive list of com-
parative criteria,33 including local ownership, integration of ownership
26. See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also
notes 70-77 infra and accompanying text.
27. See Formulation of Policies, supra note 12, at 429. See also Cowles Florida Broadcast-
ing, 60 F.C.C.2d 372, 430, 435 (1976) (Wiley & Robinson, Comm'rs, dissenting).
For an extensive listing of articles suggesting reform of the comparative hearing, see Comment,
Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a Structural Modelfor FCC Comparative Broadcast Li-
cense Renewal Hearings, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 573 n.5 (1976).
28. Several cases hold that no hearing need occur when an application fails to satisfy the
Commission's rules or when an applicant does not meet the Commission's basic qualifications.
See 47 U.S.C. § 303(a-s) (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192
(1956); WLVA, Inc. v. FCC, 459 F.2d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Goodwill Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 325
F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
29. The Act requires only that the Commission grant a license to the applicant who will best
serve the public interest. The Commission's power to derive standards by which to judge an
applicant has never been questioned. See National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578,
581 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Within these broad confines [of public interest], the Commission is left with
the task of particularizing standards to be used in implementing the Act.").
30. Thejudiciary requires only that the Commission take evidence on all the relevant charac-
teristics of the applicants. In Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351 (1949) the court
held: "The Commission cannot ignore a material difference between two applicants and make
findings in respect to selected characteristics only. . . .It must take into account all the character-
istics which indicate differences, and reach an overall relative determination upon an evaluation
of all factors, conflicting in many cases." Id. at 357.
3 1. The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's power to adapt its comparative criteria to
changing circumstances. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
32. Anthony, supra note 16, at n.159 (quoting NETWORK BROADCASTING: REPORT OF THE
NETWORK STUDY STAFF TO THE NETWORK STUDY COMMISSION, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85TH
CONG., 2D SEss. 68-72 (1957)).
33. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON LICENSES
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and management, control of other broadcast or print media, and pro-
posed programs.34 Application of these criteria, in the Commission's
view, would provide broadcast outlets in the best interests of the local
service community." The Commission presumed that applicants
whose owners were members of the community would be closely at-
tuned to the desires and problems of that locality.36 Furthermore, local
owners who participated in station management would air locally ori-
ented programs. 37 The Commission, therefore, placed a great deal of
weight on proposed programming,38 emphasizing that significant
amounts of local live programs 39 would best demonstrate an applicant's
AND AUTHORIZATIONS, LICENSING OF MAJOR BROADCAST FACILITIES BY THE FEDERAL COMMU-
NICATIONS COMMISSION 55-64 (1962), reprinted in Hearings before the Subcomm. No. 6 of House
Select Comm. on SmallBusiness, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. A87-A 178 (1962), relevant portions cited in
W. JONES, ELECTRONIC MEDIA 43-45 (2d ed. 1979) (summary of the 15 most frequently used
criteria).
34. The Commission usually places most weight on these four factors. See, e.g., Central
Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189
(1979) (diversification and integration entitled to weight); Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v.
FCC, 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 918 (1961) (newspaper ownership pre-
ferred); McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
918 (1957) (newspaper ownership is basis for denial of license); Plains Radio Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 175 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (proposed programming important in license application);
The Tribune Co., 19 F.C.C. 100, afl'don reconsideration, 19 F.C.C. 650 (1954) (proposed program-
ming of applicant basis for grant of license).
35. The entire thrust of the present regulatory procedure is to provide for stations in as many
localities as possible. The present licensing system, according to the Commission, "protects the
public residing in smaller cities and rural areas more adequately than any other system." 17 Fed.
Reg. 3905, 3906 (1952).
The Act requires the Commission to distribute licenses equitably among the "several States and
communities." 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1976). The Commission, however, currently supports immedi-
ate deregulation of radio, leaving marketplace forces to provide for local broadcast outlets. See In
re Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979). For a criticism of the Commission's localism
policy see R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION
97-128 (1973); Parkman, An Economic 4nalysis of the FCC's Muliple Ownershp Rules, 31 AD. L.
REV. 205 (1979).
36. See The Tribune Co., 19 F.C.C. 100, 151 (1954).
37. Id But see notes 174-83 infra and accompanying text.
38. Courts have upheld programming as a basis of comparison between mutually exclusive
licensees. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943); Henry v.
FCC, 302 F.2d 191, 193 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962); Johnston Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
39. This criterion invited applicants to inflate initial live programming proposals far in excess
of what they actually provided. In the Tribune case, for example, the winning applicant proposed
43% local live programming, but delivered only 16.2%. Between 1952 and 1965, before the Com-
mission abandoned the subjective programming approach and adopted objective criteria, the FCC
sampled programming proposals in 35 cases. Successful applicants proposed on the average to
devote 31.5% of broadcast time to local live programming, but delivered only 11.8%. See Moline
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"ability to meet and fulfill community needs. 4 °
After formulating a method of comparing competitive applicants, the
Commission ignored the method in the first comparative renewal pro-
ceeding. In Hearst Radio, Inc.4" the FCC noted the "overriding re-
quirement" of the Act-protection of the public interest-and placed
decisive weight on the past broadcast record of the incumbent in a
comparative hearing.42 After comparing the applicants, the Commis-
sion declared the challenger "superior" in integration of ownership and
diversification, but found the incumbent (Hearst) to have provided "ac-
ceptable," though not "outstanding," service to the community. 3
Thus, the Commission concluded that the public interest would be bet-
ter served by renewing the incumbent rather than by awarding the li-
cense to an applicant with an unproven record.44
Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263, 271-73 (1973). See, e.g., Suburban Broadcasters, Inc., 30
F.C.C. 1021 (1961) (denial of license to applicant who had made same proposals for three separate
stations). Cf. KORD, Inc., 31 F.C.C. 85 (1961) (stressed importance of licensees fulfilling propos-
als); Beaumont Broadcasting Corp., 19 F.C.C. 161 (1954) (differences in programming not signifi-
cant if each applicant proposed meritorious service).
40. The Tribune Co., 19 F.C.C. 100, 152 (1954). The FCC is reluctant to regulate program
content directly, but the Supreme Court, at least with respect to the "fairness doctrine," 47 U.S.C.
§ 315 (1976), has upheld the Commission's power to force compliance. Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-92 (1969).
41. 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1176 (1951).
42. Id. By considering Hearst's past broadcast record, the Commission sidestepped § 307(d)
of the Act, which limited the Commission's comparison in a renewal hearing to "the same consid-
erations and practices which affect the granting of original applications." Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 307(d), 48 Stat. 1084 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976)). Be-
cause original applicants do not have past broadcast records, a literal interpretation of § 307(d)
should have prevented the Commission from including the incumbent's past record in the com-
parison. In 1952 Congress amended § 307(d) to delete "the same considerations and practices"
language and require all applications to meet the public interest standard. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d)
(1976). The Commission concluded that the amendment allowed the FCC complete freedom to
delve into an incumbent's past broadcast record. This amendment is possibly the basis for the
Commission's renewal expectancy policy. See Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d
37, 41 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979); Citizens Communications Center
v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1206 n.13, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Geller, The Comparative RenewalProcess
in Television.- Problems and Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L. REv. 471, 473-75 (1975).
43. 15 F.C.C. at 1174.
44. The Commission held:
Where a finding is justified that the service being rendered is in the public interest, con-
sideration should be given to the desirability of continuing such a proven acceptable
service which, in the case of the operating applicant, is indicative of an ability to main-
tain or improve the acceptable service, and to the risks attendant upon terminating such
service and making the facilities available to another applicant without a proven record
of past performance and who may not be able to render in actual practice, a service as
desirable as the one terminated.
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This -rationale effectively prevented the Commission from comparing
an incumbent and challenger because a challenger rarely possesses a
past broadcast record that is susceptible to comparison.4" The empha-
sis on past programming effectively precluded attempts to unseat in-
cumbents46 and "guaranteed" renewal.
47
Recognizing the substantial difficulties in its reliance on program-
ming48 as a basis for comparing competing applicants, the Commission
shifted the comparative criteria from subjective programming stan-
dards to objective standards based on the structural characteristics of
the applicants. The resulting Policy Statement on Comparative Broad-
cast Hearings4 9-- the 1965 Policy Statement-recognized two primary
considerations in the hearing process:" (1) the "diversification of con-
Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1176 (1951). By accepting a known versus an unknown entity,
the Commission made clear that it places primary emphasis on past "meritorious" performance as
the best indicator of future performance and that the comparative criteria serve only as "guide-
posts." Id
45. The Commission would adduce information on the past broadcast experience of the chal-
lenger to corroborate its program proposals, but usually did not grant a preference to any appli-
cant. See Beaumont Broadcasting Corp., 19 F.C.C. 161, 168 (1954); The Tribune Co.;'19 F.C.C.
100, 155 (1954); Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1182 (1951).
46. The Commission decided only one comparative renewal case in the 17 years after Hearst.
See Wabash Valley Broadcasting, 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963), in which both the incumbent and the
challenger had past broadcast records. The Commission, however, dismissed the challenger's past
record because it had been compiled in a "different medium and city." Id at 678-79.
47. The practical effect of Hearst and Wabash was to give the incumbent an advantage on
the basis of his "past broadcast record per se." Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d
1201, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In addition, the FCC's position placed the challenger in a "catch 22"
situation by minimizing any advantage that it might possess under the diversification and integra-
tion criteria. In Hearst, for example, the Commission held that the usual presumption that pro-
posed programming would be carried out by the applicant with the better integration and
diversification proposals would not be considered "where a record is available establishing the
capabilities of the management employed by prospective licensees." 15 F.C.C. at 1179.
48. See notes 38-42 supra.
49. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Policy Statement]. The Commission
recognized the various differences between the comparative hearing involving original applicants
and that concerning a renewal candidate. In a footnote to its 1965 Policy Statement, the Commis-
sion held: "This statement of policy does not attempt to deal with the somewhat different
problems raised where an applicant is contesting with a licensee seeking a renewal of a license."
1965 Policy Statement, supra, at 393 n.l. In Seven (7) League Productions, Inc., 1 F.C.C.2d 1597
(1965), however, the Commission held that the policy statement should govern the "introduction
of evidence" in renewal proceedings. Id. at 1597-98.
50. The Commission has never fully articulated its rationale for its adoption of the 1965
criteria. The adoption of structural criteria seems to reflect the Commission's inability to predict
applicant superiority based on programming. The 1965 criteria presumably reflects the qualifica-
tions that, if met, would produce the optimal chance for public interest broadcasts. See notes 31-
44 supra and accompanying text. See also Hyde, FCC Po/icyAnd Procedures Relating To Hearings
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trol of the media of mass communications" (diversification);5 and (2)
the "best practicable service to the public,"52 based on a comparison of
the applicants' proposals for owner participation in the day-to-day op-
eration of the station (integration), 3 minority ownership,54 proposed
service, 5 and past broadcast record.5 6
One justification for the use of diversification as a primary substan-
tive criterion in the licensing process is a recognition that the owner of
a few media interests can expend more time, energy, and money on the
facility in question. 57 A second justification is the Commission's belief
that the public interest is best served by providing local forums for free
expression and by preventing concentration of the mass media in the
hands of a few. 8
On Broadcast Applications In Which A New Applicant Seeks To Displace A Licensee Seeking Re-
newal, 1975 DUKE L.J. 253, 268-77; Comment, supra, note 27 at 582-83 n.62.
51. 1965 Policy Statement, supra, note 49 at 394.
52. Id at 395-96.
53. Although the Commission previously used integration in its comparative analysis, the
effect was usually diminished in a renewal situation. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying
text. The 1965 Policy Statement raised integration to decisional significance. Integration, as a
criterion, consisted of three factors: (I) full-time participation by owners in station management;
(2) local residence; and (3) broadcast experience. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 49, at 395-96.
The Commission differentiates between previous broadcast experience and past broadcast rec-
ord.
Previous broadcasting experience includes activity which would not qualify as a past
broadcast record, i e., where there was not ownership responsibility for a station's per-
formance. Since emphasis upon this element could discourage qualified newcomers to
broadcasting, and since experience generally confers only an initial advantage, it will be
deemed of minor significance. It may be examined qualitatively, upon an offer of proof
of particularly poor or good previous accomplishment.
Id at 396. The Commission will review past broadcast performance in limited circumstances.
See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
54. See TV-9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court held that although
minority participation should not be awarded an automatic preference, it was a "material factor"
that would be awarded "favorable consideration." Id at 941-42.
55. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 49, at 397.
56. Id at 398.
57. Despite the Commission's promulgation of multiownership rules, see note 20 supra, it
still considers an applicant's outside media interests as a factor in the applicant's ability to service
the local community. The Commission, however, mitigates the diversification factor in a renewal
situation. See Central Florida Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dis-
missed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979); Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975). See also notes 89-94, 102-06 infra and accompanying text.
58. See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER
STANDARDS (1962). Friendly lists the following explicit objectives of diversification:
IpIrevention of undue control over thought and opinion, locally, regionally, or nation-
ally; prevention of independent stations from impairment or destruction by the economic
power of multi-medium or multi-station operators; prevention of the exercise of undue
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The use of integration as a substantial comparative factor reflects the
importance that the Commission places on a licensee's ability to serve
local needs. 9 Additionally, the use of integration permits association
of "legal responsibilities and day-to-day performance."6
The 1965 Policy Statement prohibits the Commission from consider-
mng an applicant's past broadcast record unless the record reflects "un-
usually good" performance or "a failure to meet the public's needs.'
Proposed programming is not considered unless there are "material
and substantial" differences between the applicants.62
In WHD, Inc.63 the Commission first applied the 1965 Policy
Statement in a renewal proceeding and refused to renew the license of
the incumbent, WHDH. The Commission's primary emphasis on the
diversification and integration criteria placed the incumbent at an im-
mediate disadvantage.64 The Commission, adhering to the Policy
Statement, refused to award any preference to the incumbent, conclud-
ing that WHDH's past broadcast record was simply "average. 65
The broadcast industry severely criticized the Commission's decision
economic power on advertisers or undue preference to the larger advertiser against the
small ....
Id at 68-69.
59. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
60. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 49, at 396.
61. Id at 398. Ideally, this limitation on the Commission's consideration of past program-
ming would prevent the FCC from placing decisive weight on past service as it did in Hearst. In
reality, this has not been the case. See Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979); Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975).
62. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 49, at 397. Simultaneously, the Commission amended
its application forms to eliminate the requirement that an applicant submit a program schedule.
Between 1965 and 1971 no preferences were awarded for proposed programming. See Moline
Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263, 272, 273 n.ll (1971); In re Keith L. Reising, 1 F.C.C.2d 1082,
1084 (1965).
63. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), aff'dsub nom. Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
64. Normally, challengers are local residents who have few or no outside media interests.
Incumbents usually have large outside interests and network affiliation. See 40 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 571, 578-79 (1972); cf WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 25-26 (1969) (R. Lee, Comm'r, dissent-
ing) (major newspaper ownership of WHDH-TV and WHDH-AM-FM radio stations).
65. The Commission agreed with the examiner's "favorable" designation, but held that
WHDH's performance was only average. Even though it devoted 21% of its broadcast time to
local programming, the station had not "demonstrate[d] unusual attention to the public's needs or
interests." WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1969).
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in WHDH.66 The FCC's emphasis on diversification and integration,
rather than on past broadcast record as comparative factors, signaled a
retreat from the implicit preference for the incumbent found in Hearst
and provided incumbent licensees with an increased possibility of chal-
lenge.67
Reacting to the criticism, 68 the Commission issued a policy statement
in 1970 specifically directed at renewal applications.69 The 1970 Policy
Statement7° attempted to codify the FCC's preference for the incum-
bent by providing a bifurcated renewal hearing.7' Initially, the Com-
mission would review only the record of the incumbent. If the
incumbent's program service during the preceding year had "been sub-
stantialy attuned to meeting the needs and interests of its area,"72 re-
66. See Three Billion Dollars In Stations Down The Drain, BROADCASTINM, Feb. 3, 1969, at
19. See also Jaffe, WHDH. The FCC.And Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1963
(1969); Note, The FCC and Broadcast License Renewals: Perspectives on WHDH, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 854 (1969).
67. In the seven years preceding WHDH, only 11 competing applications were filed. In the
two years after WHDH, 24 competing applications were filed. See Geller, supra note 42, at 482 &
n.69.
68. The Commission denied reconsideration in WHDH but distinguished the case by declar-
ing that WHDH had not been a true incumbent because it had operated under a four month
temporary license. WHDH, Inc., 17 F.C.C.2d 856, 872-73 (1969). In affirmance the District of
Columbia Circuit stated: "On the unique facts presented, WHDH was neither a new applicant
nor a renewal applicant as those terms are generally construed." Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 859 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
69. 1970 Policy Statement, supra note 12.
70. The policy was a response by the Commission to the introduction of legislation by Sena-
tor Pastore, which would have amended the Communications Act of 1934 to create a presumption
of renewal. S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). This presumption also appears in more recent
legislative proposals. See note 4 supra. See also Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598
F.2d 37, n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979); Citizens Communications
Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Geller, supra note 42, at 482-83.
71. The Commission emphasized that the public interest would be served by "preserving
predictability and stability" in the broadcast industry. The FCC recognized the large financial
investment required for broadcasting, concluding that a license "subject to withdrawal" would be
a disincentive to people who wished to enter the industry and that the revocation of the license of
a broadcaster who was providing "good service" would be against the public interest. See 1970
Policy Statement, supra, note 12, at 425. In Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37,
60 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979), the Commission again based renewal on
the consideration that stability in broadcasting would be one method of serving the public interest.
See notes 132-34 infra and accompanying text.
72. 1970 Policy Statement, supra, note 12, at 425 (emphasis added). Initially, the Commis-
sion did not articulate standards by which to judge "substantial" service. The FCC did, however,
attempt to distinguish "substantial service," which would warrant prompt renewal, from "minimal
service," which would not justify immediate renewal. "Substantial" service meant that the appli-
cant served the public interest in an "ample solid fashion." Id at 425 n. 1. The public interest was
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newal would be automatically granted.73 If not, a comparison of the
applicants under the 1965 Policy Statement standards would guide the
selection of a licensee. The Commission, in effect, resurrected the pol-
icy formulated in Hearst74 by theorizing that "public needs and inter-
ests" could be served not only by providing for competition in license
hearings, but also by balancing the inherent benefits of competition
against those derived from predictable and stable broadcast opera-
tion.75
In Citizens Communications Center v. FCC7 6 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that the Commission's bifurcated proce-
dure violated the Supreme Court's mandate in Ashbacker that the FCC
conduct comparative hearings.77 In denying the Commission the right
to review an incumbent's past record wholly apart from the compara-
tive hearing, however, the Court recognized that an incumbent's past
record is "necessarily at issue" and that the public would suffer "if [an]
incumbent .. cannot reasonably expect renewal";78 thus, past supe-
rior79 performance by an incumbent should be awarded with a "plus of
major significance."' 8° The distinction between the court's holding and
"minimally" served when the applicant performed in the "least permissible fashion still sufficient
to get renewal in the absence of competing applications." Id In 1971 the Commission proposed
that "substantial" service should be determined by quantitative guidelines. See Broadcast Re-
newal Applicant, 27 F.C.C.2d 580 (1971) (Notice of Inquiry). The Commission later abandoned
the attempt to adopt percentage guidelines, fearing artificially increased local programming and
remaining unconvinced that the government should impose a national standard instead of in-
dependent programming. See Formulation of Policies, supra note 12, at 429. There has been
renewed interest in percentage guidelines as a basis for determining the service of a broadcaster.
Advocates have suggested the adoption of percentage guidelines in two "bedrock" areas-local
and informational programming- and have proposed 15% as the standard to determine "merito-
rious service." BROADCASTING, Jan. 22, 1979, at 50-52.
73. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia labelled the 1970 Policy Statement as
an attempt to "administratively enact" the Pastore bill. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC,
447 F.2d 1201, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The two situations can be distinguished: the Pastore bill
required the renewal applicant to meet only a minimal public interest standard, but the policy
statement required substantial service. See 1970 Policy Statement, supra note 12.
74. See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
75. 1970 Policy Statement, supra note 12, at 425.
76. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
77. Petitioners also claimed that the Commission had overstepped its rulemaking bounds in
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 533 (1970)). The District of Columbia
Circuit never reached this issue and decided the case on the basis of Ashbacker. 447 F.2d at 1204
n.5.
78. See 447 F.2d at 1213 n.35.
79. Id at 1213. Substantial past service presumably would "preclude renewal." Id
80. Id The court expressed concern over the substantive qualities of its "superior" standard
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the Commission's policy statement, therefore, is in the role of an in-
cumbent's past broadcast record in a renewal proceeding. In the Com-
mission's view, an incumbent's "substantial" record alone would
preclude further comparison. The court, however, held that the Com-
mission could not review an incumbent's record wholly apart from a
comparative hearing. Although a "superior" record might weigh heav-
ily in favor of renewal,8 the Commission must afford the challenger an
opportunity to show that it could provide better service. 2
After the Citizens decision, the Commission has great latitude to de-
termine what type of performance is "superior" 3 and how much
weight to accord this factor in its comparative analysis of an incumbent
and a prospective licensee.84 In addition, an expectancy of renewal
should attach when an incumbent possesses a "superior" past broadcast
record. These two factors, when coupled with the Commission's natu-
ral preference for the incumbent, seem to insure renewal.
C. Manipulation of the 1965 Criteria to Create a Renewal
Expectancy
Citizens permitted the Commission to use "superior" past perform-
ance as a factor in comparative hearings. If the past record was less
and urged the Commission to delineate such standards in a clear manner. The court also sug-
gested criteria for determining "superior service": (1) elimination of loud and excessive advertis-
ing; (2) delivery of quality programs; and (3) percentage of profits reinvested in service to the
public. Id at 1213 n.35. The court, however, did not compel the Commission to adopt these
suggestions. See Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 687 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 926 (1975). A panel suggested two more criteria: (1) diversification of ownership of mass
media; and (2) independence from governmental influence. Commissioner Fogarty selected three
more objectives:
(1) the amount of time devoted to news, public affairs, children's programs and local
programming that is "responsive to ascertained community problems, needs and inter-
ests;" (2) the amount of time devoted to programs directed to racial and cultural minori-
ties; (3) the amount of time devoted to covering "controversial issues of public
importance," editorial programming and public announcements.
BROADCASTING, Oct. 30, 1978, at 26.
81. The Commission opined that the court, although disposing of the 1970 Policy Statement,
still believed that a policy should govern renewal expectancy. "We believe that while the court
disapproved the procedure set up in the Renewal Policy Statement. . . it did not intend to over-
turn the policy that 'a plus of major significance' should be awarded to a renewal applicant whose
past record warrants it.. . Formulation of Policies, supra note 12, at 444.
82. 447 F.2d 1201, 1213.
83. The term "superior," without further elaboration, seems to be a mere substitute for the
Commission's own "substantial service" criteria. See Cowles Florida Broadcasting, 60 F.C.C.2d
372, 421-22 (1976), reconsidered in 62 F.C.C.2d 953, 955 (1977).
84. See note 80 supra.
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than "superior," the renewal applicant would be subject to comparison
only under the 1965 criteria. The Commission, however, was able to
manipulate those criteria to recreate its informal presumption of re-
newal.
In Fidelity Television v. FCC85 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals affirmed an FCC decision86 awarding renewal to an incumbent
despite its "average"87 broadcast record and the challenger's superior-
ity in integration and diversification.88 The Commission reached this
result by misapplying the 1965 Policy Statement's structural criteria.
Instead of judging both applicants strictly on their integration and di-
versification proposals, the Commission looked solely at the traditional
objectives of those criteria. 89 The Commission held that the incumbent
could achieve these goals if its structure provided the functional
equivalent of local ownership and media diversification.9" Although
RKO General, Inc., a large communications concern, owned the in-
cumbent,91 the Commission reasoned that the large number of media
interests in the area would offset the evils of concentration. 92  The
Commission also found that the autonomy granted by RKO to its local
station managers served as the equivalent of direct owner involve-
ment.93 The Commission could thus declare that neither licensee mer-
85. 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975).
86. See RKO General, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 123 (1973), a f'd sub nora. Fidelity Television v.
FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975). The Commission recently denied
renewal of the same station, KHJ in Los Angeles. See note 13 supra.
87. KHJ's performance consisted of 86.5% entertainment, 3.375% news, 3.375% religious, ag-
ricultural, and discussion programming, and 7.13% local live programming, 5% of which occurred
in prime time. 44 F.C.C.2d at 130. Although KHJ's performance had met initial proposals, its
heavy emphasis on entertainment and, in particular, on old movies, warranted neither a plus nor a
demerit. Id at 133. See 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 49.
88. Fidelity stockholders possessed insignificant interests in a local cable television station
and a small suburban newspaper. The incumbent held 18 additional licenses, owned AM and FM
stations in Los Angeles and elsewhere, and had extensive cable television holdings, 44 F.C.C.2d
at 153-54. Fidelity also proposed a program schedule more attuned to local needs-22.55% local
programming with 25.71% in prime time. Id at 130.
89. See notes 50-62 supra and accompanying text.
90. 44 F.C.C.2d at 134-36.
91. The court, like the Commission, disregarded allegations that RKO's parent, General Tire
and Rubber Co., had engaged in reciprocal commercial agreements. 515 F.2d at 690.
92. 44 F.C.C.2d at 136. The court upheld the Commission on this point, noting that the
FCC's approach to diversification was not "unreasonable or unlawful." 515 F.2d at 702.
93. 44 F.C.C.2d at 135. The Commission reached this conclusion despite community com-
plaints about the incumbent's broadcasting of extremely violent films. Id at 221. The court again
supported the Commission, stating that RKO's policy of "station independence and ... requiring
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ited a preference under the 1965 criteria and, therefore, renew the
incumbent's license.94 The court of appeals upheld the license renewal,
concluding that when applicants are essentially equal under the 1965
criteria95 the Commission can renew the incumbent's license to provide
"greater security to licensees and greater stability to the industry. 96
The Commission's manipulation of the structural criteria in Fidelity
Television prevented effective comparison of Fidelity Television and
RKO General, Inc. Once the FCC determined that the incumbent's
record was average, the Citizens decision required the Commission to
compare the applicants under the 1965 Policy Statement criteria, which
would have favored Fidelity. The Commission, however, relied on its
policy of incumbent preference 97 and awarded renewal. In essence, the
Commission disregarded both the holding of Citizens and the compara-
tive criteria of its policy statement to grant renewal to the incumbent
solely on the basis of its being a "broadcaster in the past-and nothing
else."98
III. CENTRAL FLORIDA ENTERPRISES V. Fcc
In September 1978 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at-
tempted to circumvent the Commission's ad hoc policy and continuing
practice of weighing comparative criteria to the renewal applicant's
benefit. In Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC09 the court reversed
active participation in community affairs by station employees" had served the public interest.
515 F.2d at 693.
94. 44 F.C.C.2d at 136.
95. 515 F.2d at 702-04. The court held that Fidelity did not show itself a "superior or prefer-
able applicant but rather a poor challenger who offers little more and is likely in fact to provide
somewhat less than the incumbent." Id at 702.
96. 1d at 702, 704.
97. The Commission's preference for the incumbent is apparent in the following short history
of comparative radio and television renewal hearings. From 1961 to 1978, 17 television and 31
radio comparative hearings occurred. Although the Commission denied renewal to two television
stations and eight radio stations, none of the denials were based on failure to meet the compara-
tive criteria. See Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 61 & n.23 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979) ("incumbents can 'expect' in a statistical sense that
their license will be renewed."). See also Las Vegas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 589 F.2d 594 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (applicant's fraudulent conduct causes disqualification); Gerico Inv. Co., 31 F.C.C. 625
(1961) (applicant fails to seek renewal).
98. Farragat Television Corp., 8 F.C.C.2d 279 (1967) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). See
Fidelity Television Co. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 705 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975).
99. 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979). The case comprehen-
sively discusses renewal expectancy and remarkably resembles the Fidelity case.
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a Commission decision granting renewal to Cowles Broadcasting, rea-
soning that the Commission's actions created a presumption of "re-
newal expectancy" that was incompatible with the full-hearing
requirement of section 309(e) and Ashbacker.t°°
The Commission admitted that the challenger, Central Florida
Broadcasting, had a "clear" advantage on the diversification criteria.
Central possessed no outside broadcast or mass media interests;' 0'
Cowles' parent corporation, Cowles Communications, Inc. (CCI), had
significant broadcast and newspaper interests, although CCI did not
directly control these interests. I 2 The Commission, however, using the
F'delity rationale, 103 minimized Central's advantage by arguing that
CCI's other broadcast and media interests were remote and not domi-
nant in their markets."0
The Commission next compared the applicants under the "best prac-
ticable service" criterion. The Commission refused to reward Central's
stronger integration proposals'0 5 because of Cowles' established use of
100. Id at 41. In addition to applying the standard comparative criteria issued in the 1965
Policy Statement, see note 54 supra, the Commission took evidence on specific designated ques-
tions concerning the licensee's character and violation of Commission rules. Cowles Florida
Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 372 (1976), vacatedsub nom. Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v.
FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979).
The first designated issue was whether Cowles' moving of its main studio from Daytona Beach
to Orlando violated 47 C.F.R. § 73.613 (1977). Unlike the rules concerning the main studios of
FM stations, id § 73.210, and AM stations, Id § 73.30, the rules regarding television studios do
not list mandatory numbers of programs that must originate to be declared "main." The Admin-
istrative Law Judge noted the lack of specificity in the rules, but found on the basis of common
usage that Cowles had moved its "main" studio.
The second issue concerned allegations of mail fraud by Cowles' parent company, CCI, and
whether they supported adverse character inferences sufficient to deny Cowles renewal. 60
F.C.C.2d at 398-400.
101. Id at 395, 407-09. On reconsideration the Commission clarified the decisional weight
given to Central's diversity advantage. See Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 953,
955-57 (1977); notes 116-18 infra and accompanying text.
102. CCI owned an AM-FM-TV combination in Des Moines, Iowa, a radio station in Mem-
phis, and 24.6% stock ownership of the New York Times Co. 60 F.C.C.2d at 393.
103. 62 F.C.C.2d at 957.
104. Presumably, the Commission believed that CCI's noncontrolling interests prevented the
media concerned from speaking with a common voice. 60 F.C.C.2d at 394. Central argued that
superiority in diversification was per se decisive and rendered everything else irrelevant. Id at
407. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944) (media diversification is clear first
amendment objective).
105. Three of Central's shareholders, who controlled 10.5% of the stock, were to occupy mana-
gerial positions for a limited period. The Commission, citing the full time integration require-
ment of the 1965 Policy Statement, concluded that such participation did not merit decisional
consideration. Central also proposed a 5.2% ownership by two black men. The Commission
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local resident managerial personnel and because of noninterference
with station management autonomy. 0 6 In addition, the Commission
found that the incumbent's past broadcast record'0 7 was superior and
thus constituted a "plus of major significance."' 08 Cowles' legitimate
renewal expectancy under the Hearst doctrine, its "superior" perform-
ance under Citizens, and the Commission's general disinclination to use
the license process to "restructure the industry"0 9 gave the incumbent
a distinct preference on the "best practicable service" issue. The Com-
mission thus concluded that this preference outweighed Centrals'
"clear" advantage under the integration criteria.' '0
The Commission's analysis in Central Florida, although parallel to
Fidelity, differs in an important respect."' The Fidelity decision never
reached the issue of "superior performance" outlined in Citizens."2 In
Central Florida the Commission applied the "superior" criteria to give
the incumbent a "plus of major significance" that overrode Central's
comparative advantage, but only after dismissing the criteria normally
used to measure the differences between applicants because one appli-
awarded Central a merit in light of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision in TV-9,
see note 54 supra, but did not consider it sufficient to outweigh Cowles' integration proposals. 60
F.C.C.2d at 415,416. See Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 48, 56 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979). See also Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 &
n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (interpreting TV-9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 986 (1974)).
106. 60 F.C.C.2d at 416. The Commission then concluded that neither Central nor Cowles
deserved a preference. Id
107. The Commission cited numerous examples of public praise by various local officials and
concluded that Cowles had been "solidly" involved in local issues, despite the Administrative Law
Judge's characterization in the preliminary hearing of Cowles' performance as only acceptable.
Id at 417-20.
108. Id at 421.
109. The Commission opposes the restructuring of the broadcast industry via diversification:
In connection with both any policy that may be developed and with comparative re-
newal proceedings that may occur before the development of such policy, we do not
believe the Court in Citizens Communications Center is seeking to have ownership pat-
terns of the broadcast industry restructured through the renewal process; that, rather, any
overall restructuring should be done in a rulemaking proceeding. And what we consider
to be the necessary overall restructuring has been done today.
Id at 410 (emphasis in original).
110. Id at 418-23.
111. The Commission noted the similarities between Central Florida and Fidelity and con-
cluded that the same analysis would be proper. Idat 415.
112. The court did not need to consider the incumbent's past programming because the FCC
deemed minimal service by the incumbent sufficient for renewal when the applicants were other-
wise essentially equivalent. Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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cant was a renewal candidate."1 3 The court, like its predecessor, 1 4
never delineated precise enforcement standards for determining "supe-
rior" performance; thus, the FCC selected its own criteria and con-
cluded that Cowles met the standards." 5
The Commission issued a clarification to describe clearly the signifi-
cance of Cowles' past broadcast record and the limited weight given to
Central's diversity superiority." 6 The Commission on reconsidera-
tion" 7 abandoned the word "superior," finding instead that Cowles'
performance was "solid, favorable and substantially above level of me-
diocre service which might just minimally warrant renewal.""'  The
FCC thus concluded that the legitimate renewal expectancy implicit in
the Act' ' 9 entitled a broadcaster with a solid record to special consider-
ation. 20
The court's reversal and remand of the decision to renew Cowles
113. The Commission in effect disregarded the 1965 Policy Statement and the "full hearing"
requirement upheld in Citizens. By inequitably balancing the advantages awarded in each com-
parative category, the Commission effectively lessened the decisional significance of the criteria
and awarded renewal solely on the incumbent's past broadcast record. Central Florida Enter-
prises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 49-50 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979).
114. See notes 76-84 supra and accompanying text.
115. The Commission appraised Cowles on the basis of its community involvement, criticism
by local leaders, complaints against the station, and Cowles' performance vis-a-vis other stations
in the area. Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 372 (1976).
116. Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 953 (1977).
117. The Commission's original classification of Cowles' record as superior was based on two
factors. The FCC was aware that Citizens required superior performance before a renewal expec-
tancy vested. In addition, a labelling of Cowles' performance as anything less than superior would
promote a "substantial danger [that] incumbents [would] be tempted to lapse into mediocre per-
formance." 60 F.C.C.2d at 422. Chairman Wiley, dissented in the original opinion's classification
of Cowles' performance as superior, but concurred in the reclassification to "substantial."
As indicated, I did not-and do not now-find Cowles' service to be superior (in the
sense of exceptional). However, I did-and do now-find that service to be sufficiently
substantial (in the sense of solid and favorable) to warrant renewal. Accordingly, given
the majority's clarification of intent, I find myself able to concur in this matter.
62 F.C.C.2d at 959 (Wiley, Comm'r, concurring).
118. 62 F.C.C.2d at 955. The Commission felt that the term "superior" would imply that
Cowles' performance "had been exceptional when compared to other broadcast stations." Id at
956. See Broadcast Renewal Applicant, 31 F.C.C.2d 443,444 & nn.l & 2 (1971) (further notice of
inquiry).
119. See cases at note 9 supra.
120. As to Central's diversification superiority, the Commission simply reiterated its belief
that the remoteness of Cowles' other media interests proportionally diminished Central's advan-
tages. The Commission described the dangers of concentration as "any national or other uniform
expression of political, economic, or social opinion." 62 F.C.C.2d at 957.
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signals an abandonment of its "tacit" approval of FCC decisions.1 21
Judge Wilky held that the Commission acted "unreasonably and with-
out substantial record," inadequately demonstrated how it had bal-
anced the comparative factors, and seemingly decided the case only on
"administrative intuition."' 12 2 The court was primarily disturbed at the
Commission's undermining of Citizens by a discretionary weighing of
Central's clear superiority in integration and diversification. 123 The
court found that the Commission rendered idle these comparative crite-
ria and used Cowles' record as the only basis for decision. 24 The
Commission's "reconstructed" 1965 criteria thus created a "de facto
presumption" of renewal. 125
The court, however, did not eliminate the concept of renewal expec-
tancy, although Judge Wilky emphasized that the Commission's recast-
ing of Cowles' performance from "superior" to "substantial" prevented
the award of a "plus of major significance."' 26  The court instead
adopted the language of an earlier Supreme Court decision' 27 that
found renewal expectancies derived from "meritorious" service to be
121. Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99
S. Ct. 2189 (1979). The Court's decision alarmed both the Commission and the broadcast indus-
try. BROADCASTING, Jan. 22, 1979, at 50-52; BROADCASTING, Oct. 2, 1978, at 28-30. The presi-
dent of the National Association of Broadcasters concluded that the Central Florida opinion was
"the most disturbing from industry stability standpoint in a long time, more than WHDH-TV."
Id at 28.
122. Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 49-50 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert dis-
missed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979). The court was aware that some licensing decisions are based on
"agency intuition." In Star Television, Inc. v. FCC, 416 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 888 (1969), Judge Leventhal, commenting on an agency's selection of one applicant from
among many qualified applicants, stated that when an agency has "no meaningful way of choos-
ing on principle between [applicants]; all [it] can really do is speculate who will do the best job in
the public interest [and conclude that the] best possible hunch is X." Id at 1094. The Citizens
court concluded, however, that the Commission's rationale fell "somewhere on the distant side of
arbitrary." Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dis-
missed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979).
123. Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 51-58 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dis-
missed, 99 . Ct. 2189 (1979). The court noted that the Commission had technically complied
with the hearing requirement, but stated that the Commission's policy substantially departed from
"established law and statutory and judicial precedent. ... Id at 50.
124. The Commission actually returned to its 1970 Policy Statement, granting renewal to a
licensee who demonstrated adequate but average service. Central Florida reflected the Commis-
sion's displeasure with the confines of the 1965 Policy Statement, the comparative process, and the
Citizens holding. See Formulation of Policies, supra note 12, at 429; Cowles Florida Broadcast-
ing, 60 F.C.C.2d 372,431 (Wiley, Comm'r, dissenting); id at 442 (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting).
125. 598 F.2d at 50-51.
126. Id at 57.
127. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1978).
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consistent with the public interest inquiry of the Act.' 28
The real significance of the opinion, however, is not the abandon-
ment of the "superior" standard, but rather the court's different view of
the incumbent's past performance. In Citizens an incumbent's superior
past performance was relevant only as a predictor of future perform-
ance. l2 9 Past performance was only evidence, albeit the "best evi-
dence,"' 3 ° of an applicant's merit, which when combined with
comparisons of integration and diversification supported the Commis-
sion's determination of which candidate would best serve the public
interest.' CentralFlorida adopts the Commission's argument that the
stabilizing effect in the industry attributable to a renewal expectancy is
a distinct method of serving the public interest.'3 2 In this context, re-
newal of an incumbent with a "meritorious" record would be certain.
The FCC would rather not upset the stability of the industry by award-
ing a challenger the license, even if the predictive values of integration
and diversification show it to be the better candidate.' 33 The court, by
adopting this construction of public interest, in effect permits the Com-
mission to use a noncomparative factor in a renewal proceeding, which
if given sufficient weight, would override any comparative advantage of
a challenger and guarantee renewal to an incumbent. 34
Whether the opinion overrules Citizens and reinstates the 1970 Pol-
icy Statement is questionable. Certainly, the opinion grants the Com-
mission enormous discretion in assigning importance to industry
128. The Supreme Court held that the public interest would be served by rewarding renewal
to those broadcasters who had "invested [the] money and effort necessary to produce quality per-
formance." Id at 805. The Court stated that these renewal interests were "legitimate" and
"should not be destroyed absent good cause." Id See Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC,
598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979); Fidelity Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975); Citizens Communications Center
v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
129. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See Cen-
tral Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct.
2189 (1979).
130. Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed,
99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979).
131. Id at 55, 59.
132. Id at 43, 60.
133. The court admitted that the "stability" theory appeared to be a "plausible construction of
'public interest."' Id at 60.
134. Id
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stability,135 but the court did not discuss the implications of Central
Florida on Citizens or on the two tier analysis of the 1970 Policy State-
ment. Presumably, Ashbacker and the Act still require a comparative
hearing. Therefore, industry stability would be only one element in the
Commission's determination of the best applicant. 36 The great leeway
granted the Commission, however, preordains renewal, despite the pre-
dictive factors, 137 whenever the FCC finds "meritorious" service.
The District of Columbia Circuit has shifted radically on the issue of
renewal expectancies in broadcast licensing. 138 In recognizing that the
public interest can be served by promoting industry stability, the court
permits the Commission to circumvent Ashbacker. The challenger
must now prove not only that its broadcasting services will be superior
to those provided by the incumbent, but also that denial of renewal to
the incumbent will not upset the delicate stability of the broadcast in-
dustry. Certainly, any possibility of nonrenewal will constrict an estab-
lished licensee's desire to expand and improve his facility. The weight
of the challenger's burden will make the comparative hearing the
"empty thing"' 39 that Ashbacker seeks to prevent.
IV. REGULATORY REFORM
The Commission's dissatisfaction 4 ' with the comparative hearing
135. The court expressed concern that the Commission had not specifically argued the indus-
try stability factor: "there were few intimations that this was the Commission's inchoate ration-
ale." Id
136. The court realized that the Commission's use of industry stability as a factor must be
subject to judicial review.
This would seem to require that the Commission describe with at least rough clarity how
it takes into account past performance, and how that factor is balanced alongside its
findings under the comparative criteria. Although mathematical precision is, of course,
impossible, something more than the Commission's customary recitals, "completely
opaque to judicial review," must be provided.
Id at 60-61.
137. The court stated: "The weighing of policies under the 'public interest' standard is a task
that Congress has delegated to the Commission in the first instance." Id at 44.
138. Compare Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1207-09 & nn.17, 23
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (recognition of court's bias in favor of incumbent), with Central Florida Enter-
prises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2189 (1979) (court's
affirmation of FCC's renewal decisions creates renewal expectancy in violation of Act).
139. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945).
140. See Formulation of Policies, supra note 12. Chairman Ferris called the present system of
licensing an "anachronism" with costs that have not equalled the "public interest benefits." Hear-
rngs before the Subcomm. on Communications ofthe Comm, on Interstate andForeign Commerce on
H . 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, 117 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings].
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process and its inability to apply consistently the 1965 criteria indicate
that the current licensing system is an administrative nightmare and
that reform 141 is needed. One commentator suggests that a licensee re-
ceive a vested property right upon the granting of a license.t42 The best
solution, however, seems to be the abandonment of the comparative
hearing procedure in both original and renewal license applications.
A. Legislative Response
In 1978 and 1979 the House and the Senate Subcommittees on Com-
munications considered legislation that would significantly overhaul t43
the broadcast provisions'" of the 1934 Act. The bills 45 reflect congres-
sional apprehension of the present regulatory scheme and propose sev-
eral fundamental changes in policy.' 46
Each bill would eliminate the comparative hearing for original appli-
141. Commentators have suggested numerous methods to reform the current licensing system,
including the development of precise quantitative percentage program guidelines, a ranking sys-
tem based on an applicant's compliance with priority programming categories, and comparison
oriented towards technical qualifications. Other suggestions include the granting of an indefinite
license term, a lottery among applicants, or an auction of available frequencies. See Anthony,
supra note 15 (ranking system); Geller, supra note 42 (percentage guidelines); Robinson, The Fed-
eral Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169 (1978)
(lottery and auction); Comment, Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a Structural Modelfor
FCC Comparative Broadcast License Renewal Hearings, 43 U. CI. L. REv. 573 (1976) (technical
qualifications). See also De Vany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara, & Scott, ,4 Property Systemfor Market
Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: 4 Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1499 (1969); Mayer & Botein, Ashbacker Rites in Administrative Practice.- A Case Study of
Broadcast Regulation, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 461 (1978).
142. See Cowles Florida Broadcasting, 60 F.C.C.2d 372, 435 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, dis-
senting).
143. Representative Lionel Van Deerlin, Chairman of the House Subcommittee, pledged that
the proposed legislation would amend the current Act from "basement to attic." BROADCASTING,
June 12, 1978, at 29.
144. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-30 (1976).
145. The House and the Senate legislation involve comprehensive amendments pertaining to
common carriers, public telecommunications, cable television, and satellites, as well as to over-
the-air broadcasting. For the limited focus of this discussion, only portions of the following bills
are relevant: S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 331-34 (1979); H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 411-13, 415, 417-18, 461-62, 471 (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. §§ 411-12, 414, 416-
17, 431, 434 (1978).
146. The House versions eliminate the "public interest" standard as the basis for Commission
licensing procedures. These proposals provide for governmental regulation of the broadcast in-
dustry when "marketplace forces are deficient." H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (1979);
H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 101 (1978). See S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (2) (1979)
(recognizing marketplace competition, but retaining a limited public interest standard for renew-
als).
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cants.' 47 Instead, after the applicants meet certain technical qualifica-
tions,11s the Commission would grant the license on the basis of
random selection. 149  One Senate proposal would adopt a modified
1970 Policy Statement approach to renewal applications. 50  A pre-
sumption of renewal arises if the Commission determines that the in-
cumbent has "substantially met the problems, needs and interests of its
service area," and the operation has not been "seriously deficient."' 15'
The Commission can then renew the license without a hearing. The
most revolutionary changes appear in the House rewrites, which call
for the elimination of renewal procedures and the infusion of indefinite
licenses for television subject to revocation by the Commission. 52
147. See S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 331 (1979); H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 415(d)
(1) (A) (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 414(c) (1978). A second Senate bill retains the
hearing requirement of § 309(e), but specifically prohibits the FCC from considering the diversifi-
cation and integration proposals of the applicants. See S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301(a),
302(i) (1979).
148. The Commission will take evidence on the citizenship, character, and financial qualifica-
tions of the applicant; ownership of the proposed station; frequencies and power; hours of opera-
tion; and the purposes of the station. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 417(a) (1)-(5), (b) (1979);
H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 416(a) (1)-(5) (1978). See S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 331
(1979) (retaining technical requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1976)).
149. See note 147 supra. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 415(d)(1)(B) (1979) further pro-
vides that the Commission must represent minority applicants twice in the lottery pool for a new
frequency. Section 415 is intended to promote diversity of ownership in broadcasting by provid-
ing easy access for minorities. In TV-9 the court held that minority interests would be in the
public interest because they would provide programming diversity. TV-9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d
929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974). In a dissenting opinion, Judge Leventhal
concluded that when the Commission faces two or more "reasonably qualified" applicants, a lot-
tery system would be permissible. "Perhaps a lottery could be used, for luck is not an inadmissible
means of deciding the undecidable, provided the ground rules are known in advance." Star Tele-
vision, Inc. v. FCC, 416 F.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 888 (1969).
150. S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 332(c), (d) (1979). A second Senate bill introduced in
1979 would retain the present comparative hearing system, but would not permit the Commission
to consider diversity of media interests or integration of management. See S. 611, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. § 302 (1979).
151. S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 322(c), (d) (1979).
152. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 461, 464 (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.
431, 437 (1978). H.R. 3333 provides for revocation of an indefinite license only by motion of
the Commission. The bills provide, however, that the licensee must broadcast non entertainment
programs, devote time to controversial issues, and provide for conflicting views. H.R. 3333, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 462 (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 434 (1978). A lack of compli-
ance presumably would constitute a ground for revocation. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 418
(1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 417 (1978).
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B. Is Regulation Necessary? 53
Opponents of the congressional attempts to deregulate the broadcast
industry cite two theoretical reasons for their position: (1) the electro-
magnetic spectrum is a scarce commodity that inherently requires gov-
ernmental regulation; 154 and (2) the broadcast media exert such
enormous control over public thought and opinion that regulation-
licensing applicants who would serve the public interest-is necessary
to protect the public from potential abuse.
155
153. Certainly, the Commission should regulate the industry to prevent interference,
Government assignment of frequency, power, and geographics are necessary or else broadcasting
would return to the days of "confusion and chaos." National Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S.
190, 212 (1943). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); Deregulation
of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 498 (1979).
Regulation, as described in this Note, refers to indirect "conduct-related" rules that regulate
broadcasters through the comparative hearing. Such regulation attempts to promote specific types
of programming by compelling a licensee to follow the guidelines or be denied a license. The
Commission recognizes that governmental regulation of programming, though "indirect and
content neutral," must balance the first amendment right to freedom of expression with the first
amendment right to the widest possible dissemination of information. The present licensing
scheme effectively supplants the Commission's view on desirable programming for the views of
the broadcaster and of the listening and viewing public. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d
457, 482-83 (1979); Goldberg & Couzens, "Peculiar Characteristics'" An Analysis of the Firsl
Amendment Implications of Broadcast Regulation, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 1, 12-19 (1978); Robinson,
7he FCC and the First Amendment; Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation,
52 MINN: L. REV. 67, 118-19 (1967) (referring to present renewal scheme as licensing 'in
terrorem').
154. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 140, at 341 (statement of Commissioner Fogarty); id at
150 (statement of Commissioner Washburn); id 535 (statement of Rev. Everett C. Parker). The
scarcity theory is the subject of much commentary. See, e.g., B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965); Bazelon, The First
Amendment and the "New Media'--New Directions in Regulating Tele-Communications, 31 FED.
COM. L.J. 201 (1979); Bazelon, FCCRegulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J.
213; Goldberg & Couzens, supra note 153; Parkman, supra note 35; Robinson, supra note 153;
Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy. The Broadcasters' Dilemma, 32 GEo. WASH, L. REv. 719
(1964); Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Media Regulation, 28
STAN. L. REv. 563 (1976); Note, The Proposed Communications Act Rewrite Potomac Deregu-
latory Fever v. The Public Interest, 48 U. CiN. L. REV. 476 (1979).
155. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 140, at 674 (statement of Nicholas Johnson). The Supreme
Court probably would not permit regulation that would abridge first amendment rights solely on
the basis of the "influence of the speaker." Robinson, supra note 162, at 156. See Superior Films
v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Governmental regula-
tion of broadcasting is supported on a number of additional grounds: (1) the airways are in the
public domain and broadcasters use them as trustees; (2) a broadcaster, as a public trustee, also
constitutes a public forum for providing diverse viewpoints; and (3) the public as an "involuntary
recipient" of broadcast programs is a "captive audience" that requires protection. See Goldberg
& Couzens, supra note 153, at 30-39; Robinson, supra note 153, at 150-54.
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1. Regulation to Preserve Scarce Commodity
The Supreme Court has continually upheld scarcity of frequencies as
the basis for governmental regulation of broadcasting.' 56 As the Court
stated in Red Lion Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 5 7 the finite number of
broadcast frequencies "justifies the Government's choice of those who
would best' '58 serve the public; scarcity exists when there are "substan-
tially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequen-
cies to allocate."' 59 Under this rationale governmental regulation is, in
effect, a quidpro quo for the use of a limited resource. 160
Under the present allocation of radio frequencies, however, the po-
tential exists for twenty-seven AM and 100 FM channels per market. 16 1
In the television spectrum, VHF will support thirteen channels, with
seven as the typical maximum per market. UHF has a seventy channel
capacity.' 62  Cable television, although not considered "over the air"
broadcasting, provides additional media outlets.' 63 Furthermore, the
Commission argues that changes in its allocation scheme can increase
the number of broadcast frequencies. The Commission can expand the
amount of spectrum space currently assigned to commercial broadcast-
ing."M Technological advances also can provide for more broadcast
156. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
157 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In RedLion the Supreme Court upheld the fairness doctrine against
first amendment challenges. The Court has stricken similar statutes relating to newspapers. See
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); note 177 infra.
158. 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969). The petitioners argued that scarcity no longer existed. Id See
notes 161-65 infra and accompanying text.
159. 395 U.S. at 388.
160. The requirement that a broadcaster air less profitable public interest programs is the quid
for the quo, a valuable license.
161. Parkman, supra note 37, at 211 n.24.
162. Id
163. In 1979 more than 4,000 operating cable systems served 14 million subscribers, represent-
ing 19.1% of the present television audience. Cable systems have a capacity of over 20 channels.
In 1978 the majority of cable systems provided between 6 and 12 channels. See W. JoNEs, supra
note 35, at 383. See generall LaPierre, Cable Television and the Promise ofProgramming Diver-
sti, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 25 (1973); Moss, Cable Television: A Technologyfor Citizens, 55 U.
DET. J. U-a. L. 699 (1978); Note, Unleashing Cable T V, Leashing the FCC ConstitutionalLimita-
tions on Government Regulation ofPay Television, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 647 (1978); Note, FCC
Regulation of Cable T V, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 204 (1979); Note, The FCC's Cable Television Jurisdic-
tion: Deregulation b, Judicial Fiat, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 718 (1978).
164. The expansion of the commercial broadcast spectrum by "extensive" means is not with-
out costs. Present users of those frequencies would have to relocate to another part of the spec-
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stations under the current allocation by permitting a reduction of chan-
nel spacing without increasing interference.' 65
Thus, the actual limitations of broadcasting do not, despite the
Supreme Court's assumption, 66 stem from the lack of available broad-
cast frequencies.' 67 Potential economic168 restrictions certainly inhere
in the broadcast media, but these limitations should not form the cur-
rent rationale for regulation. 69 The present method of licensing-the
trum. Additionally, radio and television sets would have to be adapted to receive the new
impulses. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 499 (1979); Coase, The Federal Conmun-
cations Commission, 2 J. LAW ECON. 1 (1959); Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: 4 Con.
sistent Theory of/Media Regulation, 28 STAN. L. RE. 563, 575 (1976).
165. "Intensive" spectrum utilization involves a reduction of the band width currently allo-
cated to each station. For example, AM stations operate at 10H2 intervals; by improvement in
receivers and transmitters it is possible to reduce those intervals and thus provide additional chan-
nels. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 499 (1979) (statement of policy); Clear Chan-
nel Broadcasting in the AM Broadcast Band, 70 F.C.C.2d 1077 (1979) (notice of proposed rule
making); 9KH2 Channel Spacings for All Broadcasting, 44 Fed. Reg. 39550 (1979) (notice of
inquiry); Note, supra note 164, at 575.
166. See Red Lion Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
167. Within the available frequencies, 8654 radio stations and approximately 1000 television
stations exist. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 481 (1973); Note, The Proposed Com.
munications Act Rewrite.- Potomac Deregulatory Fever v. The Public Interest, 48 U. CIN. L. REv.
476, 478 n.9 (1978).
168. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), Justice Frankfurter
gave the following reason for regulation of broadcasting: "unlike other modes of expression radio
inherently is not available to all . . . and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is
subject to governmental regulations." Id at 226. There are, however, 386 vacant FM frequencies
for which there are no applications. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 499 n.147A
(1979). Although these assignments exist in smaller markets, the vacancies occur because there is
a limited demand for advertising in any market. Id at 499-500. The television industry is similar.
Although the present VHF system can provide up to 70 channels in a market, about only 400
stations operate. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 140, at 158 (statement of Margita White). Former
FCC Chairman Newton Minow argues that overall technological scarcity does not motivate regu-
lation; rather, the cause is a real shortage of frequencies in major UHF television markets. For-
mer Chief Judge David Bazelon disagrees; the "shortage" is not technological, but caused by the
"market power gained by VHF licensees through FCC policies on allocation of frequencies and
relative development of alternative" broadcast methods. See Bazelon, FCC.Regulation ofthe Tele-
communications Press, 1975 DUKE L. J. 213, 225-26 n.40.
169. The scarcity argument weakens further in light of the current state of the newspaper
industry. As of March 30, 1978, there were 1,753 daily and 668 Sunday newspapers. See Deregu-
lation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 482 n. 118 (1979). Broadcast media outnumber print media
almost four to one. Many cities have at least three television stations and numerous radio stations
but only one newspaper. More than 200 communities receive at least four AM radio stations. In
the largest markets an average of 31 AM stations alone operate. See Owen, StructuralApproaches
to the Problem of Television Network Economic Dominance, 1979 DUKE L.J. 191, 204 n.77. News-
papers, however, are not subject to as much regulation as broadcasters. In Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Supreme Court recognized the numerical superiority
of broadcasting and noted that "effective competition" exists in only four percent of the major
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comparative hearing-is not necessary to protect scarce radio and tele-
vision frequencies.
2. Regulation to Protect the Public Interest
The present scheme of broadcast regulation reflects the belief that
local stations are necessary "to ensure that broadcasting would be at-
tentive to the specific needs and interests of each local community" and
that local groups "would have an adequate opportunity for expres-
sion."17 The comparative licensing procedure, it is argued, promotes
these goals by awarding a license to the applicant that best meets the
diversification-of-mass-media and integration criteria.' 7 '
Despite the theoretical objectives of the comparative procedure the
structural and economic realities of radio' and television broadcast-
ing dictate the type of programming available to the public. 73 Eighty-
eight percent of all television stations are affiliated with a newtwork. 174
Although FCC rules permit an affiliate to reject network programs, 175
ninety-five percent of these programs are cleared for broadcast by the
licensee.' 76 Network programming thus represents eighty-two percent
of total broadcast time and local stations can produce programs only
metropolitan areas. Id at 249 n. 13. Despite these statistics the Court refused to invoke the scar-
city doctrine and held unconstitutional a Florida right-to-reply statute. Id at 258. An additional
argument considers the finite amount of paper, presses, and delivery trucks as a basis for conclud-
ing that access to the newspaper industry is as difficult as access to broadcasting. See Note, supra
note 164 at 563, 575.
170. Cox & Johnson, supra note 8, at 8. See also notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
171. See 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 49; see notes 50-62 supra and accompanying text.
172. The FCC contends that competition in major radio markets led to increased specializa-
tion of radio formats. Small stations present less specialized programming to stay economically
viable. Additionally, radio production costs are smaller than television programming costs; there-
fore, radio stations can better afford to target programs to specific groups. See Deregulation of
Radio. 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 485-87 (1979).
173. The effect of economics and the profit motive on television programming and federal
regulation is the subject of much commentary. See, e.g., R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. MCGOWAN,
supra note 35; B. OWEN, J. BEEBE & W. MANNING, TELEVISION ECONOMICS (1974); Owen, supra
note 177; Parkman, supra note 35; Schuesler, FCC Regulation of the Network Television Procure-
ment Process: An Attempt to Regulate the Laws of Economrics?, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 227 (1978).
174. See Parkman, supra note 35, at 216.
175. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(e) (1978) provides that no license shall be granted to an affiliated
station if its affiliation would "prevent or hinder the station from" (1) rejecting or refusing net-
work programs which the station reasonably believes to be unsatisfactory or unsuitable, or con-
trary to the public interest, or (2) substituting a program which, in the station's opinion, is of
greater local or national importance.
176. See W. JONES, supra note 33, at 147.
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during the small remaining time.'
The Commission recognizes that local stations prefer affiliation with
networks because networks can fulfill the demand for "mass audience"
programming at a small "per-viewer" cost. 78 Affiliation also produces
economic benefits by enhancing the value of advertising time sold to
local advertisers for network programs, and provides a carryover audi-
ence to increase the value of its nonnetwork advertising.1
79
FCC efforts through its Prime Time Access Rules (PTAR)180 to con-
trol directly the amount of network programming that a local station
can broadcast have been largely unsuccessful. The purpose of PTAR
was to create a profitable time slot for local public interest programs
and programs produced by independent syndicators, but most local sta-
tions filled this time with game shows and similar inexpensive mass-
appeal programs.' 8 ' Local stations are hesitant to schedule unprofita-
ble, public interest programming. One study" 2 indicates that an incen-
tive to -produce specialty programming-ballet and opera, for
instance-exists only after mass appeal programming reaches a satura-
tion point. As more popular program stations enter the market, the
number of popular program viewers per station declines until opera
and ballet supporters attain a comparable market share of viewers.
177. See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, supra note 35, at 108-09; Parkman, supra note
35, at 216. See also Cox & Johnson, supra note 8.
Most local stations use this time to air news, sports, and weather, which are popular with local
viewers. A high proportion of the remaining time, however, is devoted to nonnetwork films or
locally originated game shows. See Prime Time Access Rule, 50 F.C.C.2d 829, 836 (1975).
178. Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 486-87 (1979). The Commission concedes that
the fixed costs of television production are so great that stations seek to diffuse them by providing
"'common-denominator' programming." Id at 486.
179. See W. JONES, supra note 33, at 147; R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, supra note 35,
at 58-87.
180. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1978). The present PTAR is actually the culmination of a
series of rules initiated by the Commission in 1970. See Prime Time Access Rule, 50 F.C.C.2d 829
(1975); Prime Time Access Rule, 44 F.C.C.2d 1081 (1974); Network Television Broadcasting, 23
F.C.C.2d 382 (1970). The present version of the PTAR reserves one hour between 7 and 11 P.M.
(eastern time) for nonnetwork programming. The rule provides numerous exceptions for chil-
dren's programs, network overruns of sporting events, and fast-breaking news events. See 47
C.F.R. §§ 43.658(k)(l)-(6) (1978). Courts have upheld all three PTAR's against first amendment
challenges. See National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 516 F.2d
526 (2d Cir. 1975); National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 502
F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1974); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971). See
also Goldberg & Couzens, supra note 153, at 19-25; Owen, supra note 169, at 205-07.
181. See Prime Time Access Rule, 50 F.C.C.2d 829, 836 (1975).
182. See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWEN, supra note 35, at 50-54; Parkman, supra note 35,
at 50-54.
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Only at this point do specialty programs become profitable for advertis-
ers and viable for specialty programming operators.'8 3 The market
place, therefore, not the Commission, dictates the timing and the quan-
tity of local programming.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts and the FCC have had limited success in adequately im-
plementing the comparative licensing process.' 8 4  Although Central
Florida demonstrates a renewed interest in assuring that the licensing
system is equitably administered, the District of Columbia Circuit's ac-
quiescence to the FCC's use of industry stability in the comparative
hearing indicates that the procedure will remain arbitrary' 5 and ineffi-
cient.'8 6
The Commission's reliance on the structural criteria of integration
and diversification as predictors of future performance apparently has
not produced an increase in locally oriented "public interest" program-
ming.' Indeed, the "quality" of service that a licensee provides de-
pends not on the Commission's regulatory whims but on the likes and
dislikes of the audience. The comparative hearing, therefore, although
fostering competition in Commission proceedings, does not insure that
the "winner" will be the applicant more likely to produce "public inter-
est" programming.
Without competition, however, broadcasters would be induced to
maximize profits. Theoretically, the comparative licensing process
spurs broadcasters to better serve the public, but, in actuality, the hear-
183. The volume of over-the-air broadcasting is so great that it is difficult to predict how many
additional stations are necessary before the saturation point is reached. From 1964 to 1977 the
number of UHF stations increased from 84 to 368, but without a corresponding increase in spe-
cialty programming. The most successful UHF stations produce little local programming, except
professional sports and network type programming. See M. Stoller, The Economics of UHF Tel-
evision: Effects of Governmental Policy (1977) (unpublished thesis in Washington University
Olin Library). In the VHF spectrum, independent stations also follow network practices by airing
syndicated talk shows, network reruns, and movies. See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. MCGOWEN,
supra note 35, at 109.
184. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 132-34 supra and accompanying text.
186. One example of the inefficiency of the current license procedure is WFTV in Orlando,
Florida. The first application was made in 1952, but the station is presently operated by five
competing applicants while the Commission determines who will be awarded the three-year li-
cense. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
187. See notes 174-83 supra and accompanying text.
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ing results are predetermined. 18 The "competitive spur" in broadcast-
ing could best be provided directly by the viewing public. Congress
apparently agrees. Recent legislative proposals would codify the Com-
mission's policy of "renewal expectancy" and award licenses in
perpetuity. Rather than make the Commission the arbiter of the public
interest, these proposals would place that responsibility where it be-
longs-on the public.
Andrew Clark Gold
188. One observer comments that the comparative renewal process can be likened to a profes-
sional wrestling match in which "the outcome is known from the start, but some grunts and groans
are needed to make it exciting for the spectators." Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
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